Genetic Testing in Adoption  by unknown
Am. J. Hum. Genet. 66:761–767, 2000
761
ASHG/ACMG STATEMENT
Genetic Testing in Adoption
The American Society of Human Genetics Social Issues Committee and The American College of
Medical Genetics Social, Ethical, and Legal Issues Committee
Summary of Recommendations
Reports from geneticists have stated that prospective
adoptive parents and adoption agencies are requesting
a wider range of genetic tests before, during, or imme-
diately after the adoption process. It is possible that cer-
tain children who are determined to have various harm-
ful or undesirable genetic predispositions or charac-
teristics will have a difficult time being adopted or, if
adopted, will be treated differently by adoptive parents.
Although these reports must be considered anecdotal or
preliminary at the present time, it is clear that the pres-
sure for genetic testing in adoption will increase as the
range of available genetic tests increases.
The American Society of Human Genetics (ASHG)
and the American College of Medical Genetics (ACMG)
recommend the following:
1. All genetic testing of newborns and children in the
adoption process should be consistent with the tests
performed on all children of a similar age for the pur-
poses of diagnosis or of identifying appropriate preven-
tion strategies.
2. Because the primary justification for genetic test-
ing of any child is a timely medical benefit to the child,
genetic testing of newborns and children in the adoption
process should be limited to testing for conditions that
manifest themselves during childhood or for which pre-
ventive measures or therapies may be undertaken during
childhood.
3. In the adoption process, newborns and children
should not be tested for the purpose of detecting genetic
variations of or predispositions to physical, mental, or
behavioral traits within the normal range.
These recommendations are designed primarily as an
educational resource for medical geneticists and other
health care providers, to help them provide quality med-
ical genetic services. Adherence to these recommenda-
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tions does not necessarily assure a successful medical
outcome. These recommendations should not be con-
sidered inclusive of all proper procedures and tests or
exclusive of other procedures and tests that are reason-
ably directed to obtaining the same results. In deter-
mining the propriety of any specific procedure or test,
the geneticist should apply his or her own professional
judgment to the specific clinical circumstances presented
by the individual patient or specimen. It may be pru-
dent, however, to document in the patient’s record the
rationale for any significant deviation from these rec-
ommendations. (This statement does not address the
issue of the use of genetic information about the adop-
tive parents to determine their suitability for adoption.)
Background
In 1991, the ASHG issued the “Report on Genetics and
Adoption, Points to Consider” (American Society of Hu-
man Genetics 1991). The report indicated the impor-
tance of obtaining a genetic history of a child entering
foster care or the adoption process. It stated that the
“compilation of an appropriate genetic history and the
inclusion of genetic data in the adoptee’s medical files
should be a routine part of the adoption process.”When
medically appropriate, genetic data may be shared
among the adoptive parents, biological parents, and
adoptees.
In 1995, the ASHG and the ACMG issued the report
“Points to Consider: Ethical, Legal, and Psychosocial
Implications of Genetic Testing in Children and Ado-
lescents” (American Society of Human Genetics Board
of Directors and American College of Medical Genetics
Board of Directors 1995). Among other things, the re-
port stated that “timely medical benefit to the child
should be the primary justification for genetic testing in
children and adolescents.” In addition, it stated: “If the
medical or psychosocial benefits of a genetic test will
not accrue until adulthood, as in the case of carrier
status or adult-onset diseases, genetic testing generally
should be deferred.”
The ASHG/ACMG statement is consistent with state-
ments of other medical groups and organizations, in-
cluding the American Medical Association (Code of
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Ethics §2.138), the American Academy of Neurology
(Practice Parameter: Genetic Testing Alert), the Amer-
ican College of Obstetrics and Gynecology (Committee
Opinion: Ethical Guidance for Patient Testing), and the
American Society of Clinical Oncologists (Genetic Test-
ing for Cancer Susceptibility).
The National Human Genome Research Institute’s
Task Force on Genetic Testing (the NHGRI Task
Force), created by the National Institutes of Health–
Department of Energy Working Group on Ethical, Le-
gal, and Social Implications of Human Genome Re-
search, has expressly agreed with the ASHG/ACMG’s
position that timely benefit to the child should be the
primary justification for testing. The NHGRI Task
Force has recommended, in addition, that, “genetic test-
ing of children for adult onset diseases should not be
undertaken unless direct medical benefit will accrue to
the child and this benefit would be lost by waiting until
the child has reached adulthood” (National Human Ge-
nome Research Institute 1997).
Rationale
The issue of genetic testing of newborns and children in
adoption involves the interests of a number of parties:
(1) the child, (2) the adoptive parents, (3) the birth par-
ents, (4) the adoption agency, and (5) the public at large.
Of these interests, the primary concern should be for the
well-being of the child. Such an approach is consistent
with the standard applied generally to adoption
proceedings and advanced in the 1995 ASHG/ACMG
report (American Society of Human Genetics Board of
Directors and American College of Medical Genetics
Board of Directors 1995).
Child’s Interests
The best interest of the child is paramount in adoption
proceedings and forms the basis of the current legal
standard (Kawashima 1981–82; Howe 1983). The best
interest of the child encompasses concern for the child’s
physical and psychological health, privacy interests, and
social development. All these concerns may be affected
by genetic information.
A significant characteristic common to all adoptions
is the desire or need to incorporate the adopted child
into the family. The adopted child becomes a full mem-
ber of the family and acquires status equal to that of a
child biologically related to the adoptive parents (Ka-
washima 1981–82; Murray 1996, pp. 41–69). As a re-
sult, the same standard or approach recommended for
biologically related children should also be applied to
adopted children (Wertz et al. 1994).
In terms of genetic testing, the need to treat adopted
children in a manner similar to that in which biologically
related children are treated has been recognized and ad-
vanced by the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP)
in its statement on initial medical evaluations of adopted
children. The following potential problems have been
noted (American Academy of Pediatrics’ Committee on
Early Childhood, Adoption and Dependent Care 1991).
1. Some parents expect the guarantee of a “perfect
child.” They may push for unnecessary tests and ex-
pect unrealistic predictions from the pediatrician. Just
as a birth family cannot be certain that its natural
child will be healthy, the adoptive family cannot be
guaranteed that a child will not have future health
problems.
2. By focusing on an extensive medical evaluation of
a child, the pediatrician must be careful not to create
a “vulnerable” child through an exaggerated assess-
ment of historical risk. Most adopted children are
healthy, even if they come from high-risk back-
grounds. Certainly, the risks must be defined and then
carefully explained to the family, so that problems can
be anticipated and dealt with expediently. This is the
same anticipatory guidance the pediatrician uses for
all patients.
3. It is not the pediatrician’s role to judge the advis-
ability of a proposed adoption, but it is appropriate
and necessary that the prospective parents and any
involved agency be apprised clearly and honestly of
any special health needs detected now or anticipated
for the future. Thus, the pediatrician should resist un-
reasonable demands while empathizing with the adop-
tive parents’ anxieties and concerns.
The welfare of children affected by genetic conditions
should be the first concern in the practice of medical
genetics (Pelias 1999a). In assessing which genetic tests
are appropriate for all children, including adopted chil-
dren, the nature of the tests is an important considera-
tion. Among the types of tests currently available are (1)
tests for diseases that can be prevented or the health
consequences of which can be reduced through early
treatment; (2) tests for serious childhood diseases; (3)
tests for conditions that do not manifest themselves until
adulthood and for which no treatment or preventive
action is available in childhood; (4) tests indicating a
predisposition to a common adult-onset disorder for
which some general preventive measures may be taken
in childhood; (5) tests for behavioral traits; (6) tests for
carrier state and other conditions that may impact the
child’s future reproductive decisions; (7) tests that par-
ents request without any direct relation to treatment or
reproductive options for the child; and (8) tests per-
formed solely for the benefit of another family member.
Additional classifications or smaller subsets of available
tests are possible (Wertz et al. 1994; Hoffmann and
Wulfsberg 1995), and some of the categories may over-
lap when the same test is performed for more than one
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reason, but the eight types of tests described provide a
good starting point for discussion of the appropriateness
of genetic testing.
Of the eight categories of tests, only the first two cat-
egories should be viewed with unqualified approval. The
immediate availability of medical benefits for a child
who has or may soon develop a genetic condition pro-
vides the strongest reason for genetic testing (Pelias
1999a, 1999b). An often-cited example of the first type
of test is newborn screening for phenylketonuria (PKU)
(Clayton 1992, 1998; Andrews and Elster 1998). Such
tests serve the interests of the child directly, are medically
indicated, and comply with the standards set forth in
the 1995 ASHG/ACMG report (American Society of
Human Genetics Board of Directors and American Col-
lege of Medical Genetics Board of Directors 1995) and
the statements of other medical groups and organiza-
tions. The test for PKU is used to screen newborns for
a genetic condition that, left untreated, will result in
severe mental and motor retardation. Where the con-
dition is identified through testing, effective dietary ther-
apy is available (Clayton 1992, 1998). Such screening
is also frequently required by law (Clayton 1992). All
states either mandate or offer testing for PKU (The Na-
tional Academies News 1993).
The second type of test, which screens for serious
childhood conditions, should also be supported when
there is some health-related indication of the need to
test. Such indications include symptoms and family his-
tory. An example would be a child with a birth sibling
who was already diagnosed with cystic fibrosis (CF).
Interests of other parties, including the right of the adop-
tive parents to choose not to adopt a child with a cat-
astrophic disease, are discussed in the sections that
follow.
Although only these first two categories of tests are
clearly justified, the remaining categories must also be
addressed, because “the entry of such tests into the mar-
ketplace is raising the specter of their widespread use”
(Hoffmann and Wulfsberg 1995). In this regard, tech-
nology has increased the number of genetic conditions
identifiable through testing, and entities with commer-
cial interests in genetic tests are exerting pressure to
expand state screening programs and increase the num-
ber of genetic tests available to the public (The Na-
tional Academies News 1993; Andrews 1997; Buchanan
1998). In addition, some suggest that genetic testing of
children in situations in which no immediate medical
benefit is expected should not be summarily dismissed
as inappropriate, because testing may be otherwise ben-
eficial to the child depending on the purpose of the test,
the use to which the test results will be put, the level of
maturity of the child, and other individually determined
factors (Cohen 1998; Pelias 1999b). Such testing re-
quires greater consideration and caution, however, even
if allowed under some circumstances (Cohen 1998; Pe-
lias 1999b).
The third type of test, which screens for conditions
that do not manifest until adulthood and for which no
treatment or preventive action is available in childhood,
includes tests for Huntington disease (HD) and Alzhei-
mer disease. Presymptomatic tests for such serious, un-
treatable, late-onset disorders are personal in nature and
should only be conducted on a voluntary basis (Morris
et al. 1988). Moreover, where no treatment exists for
the condition even if revealed, the test is unnecessary, at
least from a medical standpoint. Currently, diagnosis for
genetic diseases far outstrips treatment technology
(Buchanan 1998). As a result, the decision about
whether to test for most late-onset or untreatable genetic
conditions is better left to the individual at a time when
he or she is mature enough to consider all the ramifi-
cations of testing (Holland 1997; Rothstein 1997). Im-
portantly, many adults with family histories of genetic
predispositions for certain diseases choose not to be
tested. For example, only 15% of those having a parent
affected with HD choose to learn their own risk for the
disease (Greely 1999). Thus, tests that fall within the
third category generally do not comport with the best
interest of the child.
The fourth type of test involves screening for predis-
position to common adult-onset disorders for which
some general preventive measures may be taken in child-
hood. The benefits of such tests, however, may not out-
weigh the costs sufficiently to warrant their support.
Tests that screen for an increased risk of skin cancer or
heart disease fall within the fourth type of test. Some of
the primary criticisms of these types of tests are that they
may label children prematurely and they may result in
the implementation of a course of medication that could
last 150 years and cause side effects and have no guar-
antee of a change in life expectancy (AAP 1992; Harrell
et al. 1998). Because of the potential for stigmatization
where individualized testing is conducted, a more pop-
ulation-oriented approach should be taken. Numerous
studies show that a majority of the population would
benefit from a more healthful lifestyle, including reduc-
ing fat, increasing exercise, and limiting sun exposure.
To the extent that selective screening is necessary, family
histories can be used (AAP 1992, 1998; Harrell et al.
1998). Because such testing for genetic predispositions
in newborns and children often lacks predictive value
and is rarely justified (Hoffmann and Wulfsberg 1995),
no special exception should be made for children in the
adoption process.
The fifth type of test attempts to screen for behavioral
traits, such as learning disabilities and personality traits.
One of the major problems with this type of test is that
biological or genetic markers have not been identified
for most childhood behavioral disorders. Other prob-
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lems include the unpredictable variability in the timing
or severity of the disorder or how it will affect the child’s
functioning. Even where a genetic marker is identified,
the stigmatization of the child and the potential for un-
critical reliance on pharmacological solutions are pos-
sible. Tests for genetic mutations that cause severe men-
tal retardation, such as fragile X syndrome, would not
be included in this category and would be considered as
a test of the second category.
The sixth type of test is directed at a child’s future
reproductive decisions and includes carrier tests for au-
tosomal recessive or X-linked disorders, such as CF and
Duchenne muscular dystrophy, and presymptomatic
tests for adult-onset disorders, such as HD (Wertz et al.
1994). Tests that may affect a child’s reproductive
choices later in life are unnecessary at the newborn stage
or in the adoption process and serve no immediate med-
ical need of the child (Wertz et al. 1994; Holland 1997).
These tests should be postponed until the child is mature
enough to decide whether to be tested (Morris et al.
1988).
The seventh type of test offers no present medical ben-
efit or future reproductive benefit but is conducted solely
at the request of the adopting parents. Carrier tests for
autosomal recessive or X-linked disorders and presymp-
tomatic tests for adult-onset disorders can also fall
within this category of tests when the child is nowhere
near reproductive age (Wertz et al. 1994). As in the case
of the sixth category of tests, tests that fall within the
seventh category do not serve an immediate interest of
the child, are not medically indicated, and do not comply
with the stated positions of ASHG, ACMG, and other
medical groups and organizations that have examined
and addressed the wisdom of genetic testing of newborns
and children.
The eighth type of test analyzes the DNA of several
members of a biologically related family to determine
the likelihood of a single individual within that family
having a certain gene mutation (Wertz et al. 1994). In
the context of adoption, this category of test lacks jus-
tification. DNA linkage analysis is relevant only to bi-
ologically related individuals. Consequently, such tests
serve no benefit to the child or the adoptive family be-
cause they are not biologically related.
The ASHG and ACMG have already recommended
that the principal objective of genetic testing should be
promoting the child’s well-being (American Society of
Human Genetics Board of Directors and American Col-
lege of Medical Genetics Board of Directors 1995). This
objective applies to adopted newborns and children as
well as to biologically related newborns and children. If
adopted newborns or children are to be integrated ef-
fectively into adoptive families, they should receive treat-
ment similar to that of the biologically related children.
No child brings a guarantee of perfection (AAP 1991).
Requiring more of adopted newborns and children than
of biologically related newborns and children turns
adopted newborns and children into commodities
(Wertz et al. 1994; Rothstein 1997). Caution needs to
be exercised to avoid crafting an approach that is too
broad in encouraging the collection of genetic infor-
mation in the adoption process. Different judgments
may be required depending on where a test falls on the
spectrum of tests for identifying genetic disorders and
conditions (Buchanan 1998; Clayton 1998; Pelias
1999b).
Genetic testing of adopted children, as well as of bi-
ological children, involves more than science and med-
icine (Pelias 1999a, 1999b). Testing can have significant
negative psychological, social, and financial implications
for the adopted child (Andrews and Elster 1998). Among
the negative implications associated with testing are the
potential for stigmatization and discrimination, altera-
tions in self-image and future prospects, and shifts in
relationships within and outside the family (Freundlich
1998; Pelias 1999a, 1999b).
The stigmatizing effect of genetic information has
broad implications. Where a genetic predisposition is
uncovered, adoptive parents may choose not to adopt
the child. As a result, testing may reduce the chances
that the child will be adopted (Rothstein 1994–95; An-
drews and Elster 1998; Freundlich 1998). Alternatively,
even if the parents choose to adopt, they may treat the
child differently because of some feeling that their child’s
future is preordained (Andrews 1997; Andrews and Els-
ter 1998; Clayton 1998; Freundlich 1998). Expectations
of the child’s role in the family may be lowered (Wertz
et al. 1994). Disclosure of the adoptive child’s genetic
information outside the family may also adversely affect
the child’s ability to obtain insurance or employment.
The issue of testing is further complicated by the am-
biguity associated with predictive testing. Genetic tests
usually do not predict when or to what degree a genetic
disease or condition will manifest itself (Holland 1997).
More importantly, the mere presence of a gene coding
for a genetic disease or condition does not mean that a
child will invariably develop the disease or condition.
Such test results supply only “probabilities, not certain-
ties” (Freundlich 1998). At best, predictive genetic tests
can only provide a range of risk. To subject a child to
the potential for stigmatization, discrimination, and
poor self-image based on ambiguous information is es-
pecially problematic (Clayton 1992; Holland 1997;
Freundlich 1998). When the disadvantages of testing are
weighed against the advantages of testing, the balance
favors not testing, except in cases where genetic con-
ditions manifest themselves during childhood or where
effective, preventive measures may be undertaken during
childhood.
The arguments against testing are even stronger if the
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purpose of testing is to detect genetic variations of nor-
mal physical conditions. Such testing is not associated
with disease or disability. To allow adopting parents to
test an adoptive child for relative genetic advantages in
physical or mental endowments reduces the child to a
commodity and creates an “underclass” of potential
adoptees. This result is contrary to the promotion of the
child’s best interest, which is at the heart of all adoptions,
and to the medical and legal standards promulgated to
protect a child’s genetic information. Moreover, as
noted, preadoption genetic testing raises significant eth-
ical concerns, including matters of autonomy, benefi-
cence, equity, knowledge, and nonmaleficence (Freun-
dlich 1998).
In summary, genetic testing of adopted children is un-
questionably appropriate if it is consistent with preven-
tive and diagnostic tests performed on all children of a
similar age. Genetic testing that has no timely medical
benefit to the child should be approached with great
caution. Genetic testing that detects genetic variations
within the normal range should be avoided.
Adoptive Parents’ Interests
Although the best interest of the child has been and
continues to be the legal benchmark of the adoption
process, modern adoption laws also seek to protect the
interests of the adoptive parents and the birth parents
(Howe 1983). Parents contend rightly that the common
law affords them broad discretion to make medical de-
cisions on behalf of their minor children (Pelias and
Blanton 1996; Andrews 1997; Pelias 1999a, 1999b).
Preventive and therapeutic medical decisions should,
however, be distinguished from predictive genetic test-
ing. As noted, the results of such testing may cause the
adoptive parents to treat the child differently and may
give rise to the potential for stigmatization, discrimi-
nation, and poor self-image (Andrews 1997). These pro-
found downsides to testing have led some to recommend
that the exercise of parental rights be circumscribed if
no immediate medical purpose is served or that testing
be postponed at least until the child can participate in
the decision (Morris et al. 1988; Andrews 1997).
Other reasons given for adoptive parents’ right to seek
genetic testing of a child include decisional, emotional,
and financial considerations. One argument offered in
favor of testing is that the adoptive parents need full
disclosure of a child’s medical background before adop-
tion so that they may make an informed decision on
whether to adopt. An extension of this argument posits
that, by allowing adoptive parents to have the child
tested before the adoption takes place, adoption annul-
ments may be avoided if parents find themselves unable
to cope with a genetic condition that manifests itself
subsequently. Another argument in favor of testing is
that certain adoptive parents lack the emotional or fi-
nancial means to care for a child with special needs
(Rothstein 1997). Adoptive parents also contend that
predictive genetic information is needed to monitor the
child’s health and seek appropriate treatment (Blair
1992; Lorandos 1996).
Once again, however, allowing adoptive parents to
gain access to a child’s predisposition to a genetic con-
dition that may never develop treats the adopted child
differently from other children of a similar age and
places a burden of perfection on the adopted child (AAP
1991). Children do not comewith guarantees. If adopted
children are required to present evidence that they are
free of genetic diseases, what tests will not be allowed?
Clearly, adoptive parents should be apprised of known
illnesses, but predictive genetic testing goes well beyond
this standard and is neither advisable nor necessary
(Morris et al. 1988; Rothstein 1997).
Yet another argument in favor of testing is that adop-
tive parents need genetic information for estate or fi-
nancial planning purposes. Because a child with a pre-
disposition for a late-onset, untreatable condition may
require special care in the future, the parents may wish
to allocate a larger portion of their estate to the child
or make other financial arrangements for the child’s care
(Clayton 1992; Holland 1997). Waiting until the child
is mature enough to make a decision about testing allows
the parents to provide for the child financially and re-
spects the child’s right to determine whether he or she
wants to know of any genetic predisposition. Alterna-
tively, where the parents do not want to wait until their
child is mature enough to make a decision about testing
or the parents fear that they will die before their child
reaches maturity or manifests a genetic condition, the
parents can establish a trust that contains a specific pro-
vision for the distribution of the trust proceeds in the
event that the child develops a medical condition re-
quiring special care (Holland 1997).
Birth Parents’ Interests
The primary interest of the birth parents who are un-
able to raise a particular child is the desire to place the
child in a safe, secure, and loving environment. In ad-
dition, parents have an interest in privacy regarding their
identity. This latter interest is reflected in the long history
of keeping adoption records sealed (Blair 1992). The
birth parents’ privacy interest is of even greater concern
when additional sensitive information, including genetic
information, is involved (Lorandos 1996). No state cur-
rently requires genetic testing of birth parents (Andrews
and Elster 1998).
Privacy is of significant interest to the child and to the
birth parents. Requiring either the child or the birth par-
ents to undergo testing as a condition of adoption
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thwarts this interest. As noted, the child may choose to
be tested when he or she is mature enough to consider
all the ramifications of testing. With the development of
direct DNA tests for genetic predispositions, less histor-
ical genetic information from birth parents will be nec-
essary. Consequently, postponing predictive genetic test-
ing until the child is ready to learn his or her status
furthers the birth parents’ and the child’s interest in
privacy.
Adoption Agency’s Interests
The adoption agency has an interest in placing the
children in its custody and in ensuring that those children
remain placed with the adoptive parents. The agency
has an interest in ensuring the privacy of the child, the
birth parents, and the adoptive parents, as well as an
interest in shielding itself from potential liability. The
protection of all these interests is necessary to the con-
tinuation of the adoption process. As a result, adoption
agencies need clear guidance on the type of information
they are required to disclose and the type of information
they are required to hold in confidence.
Because of the potential for liability, adoption agencies
may feel compelled to require genetic testing of the child
or the birth parents (Lombardo 1996). Actions have
been brought against adoption agencies for wrongful
adoption based on the agencies’ alleged negligence or
fraud in placing children without adequately disclosing
their health or genetic history (Blair 1996). Courts have
recognized a cause of action for wrongful adoption in
10 states (Leshne 1999).
In addition to being sued for failing to disclose a
child’s known health or genetic history, an adoption
agency and others involved in the placement processmay
be sued for failing to test the child for a genetic con-
dition. Although adoption agencies are not required to
and ordinarily do not conduct genetic tests, they are
required to make reasonable inquiry into the child’s
medical history. More than half the states impose an
affirmative duty on adoption agencies to disclose med-
ical information of which they are aware (Leshne 1999).
As a result, complete ignorance is not the standard.
Even if liability were not imposed, an adoption agency
sued for wrongful adoption is subjected to the time and
cost of defending itself. The mere threat of litigationmay
cause some agencies to require testing without a clear
understanding of their duties. As the availability of tests
increases, this pressure to test based on a fear of litigation
can be expected to increase. Adoption agencies are not
guarantors of the health of the children that they place.
They can only guarantee that the information in their
possession is disclosed (Leshne 1999). With more-wide-
spread, less-expensive testing in the future, some agen-
cies may seek to expand the information in their pos-
session by requiring testing for genetic predispositions.
We recommend that adoption agencies perform ge-
netic testing of children only to the extent consistentwith
this document. We further recommend that in inter-
preting family health information as well as appropriate
genetic tests, professionals trained in genetics be avail-
able for consultation with adoption agencies and pro-
spective adoptive parents.
Public’s Interests
The public has an interest in facilitating and encour-
aging adoptions and in ensuring a good fit between the
adopting parents and the child. In attempting to protect
the interests of the child, public policy should not so
restrict access to medical information in adoption that
prospective parents decline to adopt in America and in-
stead pursue adoptions overseas. Thus, professional
guidelines and public policies must strike a delicate bal-
ance to ensure the reasonable interests of all parties.
These goals may best be achieved by limiting genetic
testing of newborns and children in the adoption process
to tests that are consistent with tests performed on other
children of a similar age and designed to uncover only
childhood-onset diseases or those disorders for which
preventive measures or therapies may be undertaken in
childhood.
Conclusion
The interests of numerous parties must be balanced in
determining when to allow genetic testing of newborns
and children in adoption. Chief among these is the best
interest of the child. Although the ASHG and the ACMG
recognize the need to retain important genetic infor-
mation in the adoption process, we also recognize the
need to protect adopted newborns and children from
being subjected to potential stigmatization and discrim-
ination in instances in which genetic testing serves no
timely medical benefit. As a result, the ASHG and the
ACMG support genetic testing in the adoption process
if it is (1) consistent with preventive and diagnostic tests
performed on all children of a similar age, (2) generally
limited to testing for medical conditions that manifest
themselves during childhood or for which preventive
measures or therapies may be undertaken during child-
hood, and (3) not used to detect genetic variationswithin
the normal range.
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